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Abstract
Purpose { This paper makes two main additions to the literature on GCC (Gulf Cooper-
ation Council) monetary union. First, it emphasizes that the creation of a scal union is
necessary for the GCC monetary union to succeed. Second, it proposes some alternatives
to pegging to the dollar, which would allow the GCC countries to absorb large swings in
global commodity prices (oil, food) in the short to medium run.
Design/methodology/approach { This paper uses exploratory research to shed light on
the feasibility of a common currency for the proposed GCC Monetary Union.
Findings { Given the challenges associated with creating a GCC scal union as a require-
ment for a successful monetary union, the GCC countries could easily set up an \anti-crisis
fund" to partially protect themselves from the economic and social costs of unforeseen crises.
A BBC (basket, band, and crawl) currency system, at an individual country level or a re-
gional level, would allow the GCC countries to cope with not just large swings in global
commodity prices, but also as an eective instrument for the governments to promote their
economic diversication.
Practical implications { This paper oers a template for the GCC central banks to
consider the BBC currency system as an alternative to their existing dollar peg regime.
Originality/value { This is the rst paper that attempts to provide a formal argument in
support of the BBC currency system as an alternative exchange rate arrangement for the
GCC countries.
Paper type { Conceptual paper.
Keywords: Fixed exchange rate; Currency basket; Fiscal union; Monetary union; Gulf
Cooperation Council.
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\The dollar is our currency, but your problem."
John Connally, 1971.1
1 Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries2 are already in a monetary union with the
United States (US) dollar. The widespread and intense discussion about the planned GCC
currency union is about replacing the US dollar with the (new) GCC currency, commonly
known as the Khaleeji dinar. The benets of a currency union are well-known, as are its costs.
The major cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of sovereign monetary policy. However,
such cost is not a new phenomenon for the GCC (as the current monetary union with the US
shows), while the potential benets of a GCC-specic monetary union are presumed to greatly
outweigh its costs. Some key benets are worth reiterating here. These include transaction cost
savings, greater price transparency, increased import purchasing power and, above all, a much
needed new economic paradigm for the GCC to support the economic growth and development
of the member countries in the 21st century.
Over the past decades, a large number of academic and non-academic papers have been writ-
ten covering the economic, political and social aspects of the planned GCC monetary union. For
example, Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) conclude that the GCC countries are not yet ready
to establish a viable currency union due to the (i) dissimilarity in supply shocks, (ii) absence
of a common long-run trend among all possible pairs of countries, and (iii) limited evidence of
a common business cycle. Jean Louis et al. (2012a, b) extend the analysis in Abu-Qarn and
Abu-Bader (2008) and conclude that a monetary union is feasible, though not overwhelmingly
so. This is no occasion to oer a critical review of the existing contributions. Interested readers
are encouraged to consult the surveys by Buiter (2008), Alkholifey and Alreshan (2010), and
Alkhater. A somewhat common conclusion that arises from these surveys is that although the
GCC monetary union makes good economic sense, the project faces signicant headwinds in
terms of low intra-regional trade, a lack of supranational political institutions and enormous
gaps in research capacity.
This paper contributes to the literature on the Gulf monetary union in two ways. First, in
1President Nixon's Treasury Secretary.
2The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All
currencies but the Kuwaiti dinar maintain a de facto peg to the US dollar. However, it is widely believed that
the US dollar has a high share in the Kuwaiti currency basket.
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light of the structural problems in the European Monetary Union (EMU), this paper emphasizes
the need for the proper scal arrangements within the GCC union. In the case where market
mechanisms for risk insurance are not sucient, a monetary union requires a system of interre-
gional and intertemporal transfers which can alleviate the consequences of negative shocks such
as those that occurred in the nancial crisis of 2007{2009 (see Bordo et al. 2013). Unless the
Gulf monetary union is complemented by the GCC scal union, the political commitment to
facilitating the monetary union would be marred by low credibility.
Second, despite their massive balance of payment surpluses and the associated eects on
domestic demand, the GCC's propensity to peg to the US dollar has not changed. The unrea-
sonableness and the unsustainability of this mix of a large surplus and a peg should be clear to
the GCC's policy makers. A exible exchange rate regime will permit the GCC to absorb large
swings in commodity (oil, food) prices and allow them to devise their own monetary policy to
address domestic conditions. This paper proposes an alternative to pegging to the dollar for
the GCC countries to consider until the GCC central bank can be fully independent from the
Federal Reserve.
The plan of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a summary assessment of the current
state of economic integration among the GCC countries. Section 3 provides a description of the
proposed GCC scal union, while Section 4 oers a menu of choices of exible exchange rate
regimes for the GCC. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Current State of Economic Integration among GCC Coun-
tries
Since a thorough assessment of the economic integration is beyond the scope of this paper,3 we
limit our attention here to trade and nancial ows among the six GCC countries. Figures 1 and
2 plot the intra-GCC import and export ows over the 1975{2010 period. Several remarks are
in order. First, the magnitude of intra-GCC exports is lower than that of intra-GCC imports
because of the high share of oil in several countries' total exports. As of 2010, the average
share of oil in the combined GCC exports is nearly 75%, with Kuwait (the UAE) being the
most (least) dependent on oil exports (90% versus 35%). Second, although some members have
important bilateral import trade with other GCC countries, for the two largest economies in
3Interested readers are referred to World Bank (2010).
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the region (i.e., Saudi Arabia and the UAE), the share remains at a stubbornly low level. The
comparatively high ratios observed for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar reect, in part, the nature of
their factor endowment, being limited domestic production base. On the other hand, despite
having a narrow domestic production base, Kuwait relies on imported consumer and capital
goods from countries outside the GCC region. Overall, total trade ows among GCC countries
rose from US$8 billion in 1980, which represented 3.85% of their total trade ows with the rest
of the world, to US$62 billion in 2010, a share of 6.50% of their total trade with the rest of
the world. This suggests that despite showing some tendency for trade creation, the intra-GCC
trade is experiencing slow progress in trade integration.4 Similarities in resource endowments
and production structures and limited product dierentiation are among the possible factors
that can explain the low degree of intra-regional trade.
Compared to commodity trade, nancial integration among GCC countries has been moving
at a faster pace (cf. World Bank 2010), but the real benets from increased nancial integration
are dicult to evaluate. While intra-GCC FDI (foreign direct investment) ows and M&A
(mergers and acquisitions) activities have ourished in recent years,5 hitherto the GCC has
been unable to leverage their collective resources (e.g., sovereign wealth funds) on investment in
regional industry. Policy makers in the GCC often miss the point that intra-regional investment
is a major force to help the region to move forward as a force of change. Trade is a secondary
issue to this wider system. The GCC faces a number of challenges to achieving a strong nancial
integration in the region. One such factor is the increasing standards of corporate governance,
which portend a signicant challenge to the traditional business mindset of the Gulf companies.
As a result, the capacity for cross-listing among various Gulf bourses remains very limited.
Second, a glaring problem in the region is that none of the countries considers the abuse of
`insider information' as a criminal oence. The volatility and turbulence often observed in the
regional stock markets are largely a result of relatively \weak corporate governance and the lack
of good transparency and accountability and disclosure standards" (Saidi 2011).
Summing up, without a strong home-based economy, nancial wealth alone can be very
ineective in mitigating risks. The long-term economic and political risk of the GCC's total
trade dependence on the outside world cannot be overemphasized. Most Gulf countries are
aware of this risk and recognize the need to diversify their local economies. A visionary plan
4See Nechi (2010) for additional discussion.
5See Booz & Company (2011) and Espinoza et al. (2011) for numerical and statistical gures.
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based on greater regionalization can serve as a building block to a more healthy economic union.
3 Lessons for the GCC from Europe: A GCC Fiscal Union
One of the clearest lessons of the European debt crisis is that a monetary union without a scal
union is problematic. A common monetary policy may sometimes fail to stabilize asymmetric
shocks across members, which makes the case for insurance arrangements among members to
provide transfers to countries in more dire circumstances. A scal union thus works as an auto-
matic stabilizer across regions, providing adequate buers against asymmetric macroeconomic
shocks in a currency union.
Within the GCC, the UAE oers a close resemblance to the EMU's structure. The UAE
is a confederation of emirates, where the monetary and exchange rate policies are managed on
a federal basis by the Central Bank of the UAE. However, similar to the EMU, each emirate
manages its own scal policy independently with no explicit obligation to contribute to the
budget of another emirate (Cevik 2011).6 The limitations in the design of UAE's scal federal-
ism, as in the EMU, were exposed when Dubai World, a holding company of the Government
of Dubai, was unable to repay its debt in mid-2008, prompting the Government of Abu Dhabi
to extend nancial support to restructure the debt of Dubai World and its subsidiaries. This
incident highlights the vulnerability associated with the high degree of scal decentralization at
the sub-national level and the need for closer coordination in scal policy.
The rst step in designing proper scal policy arrangements in the GCC is to identify the
goals of the supranational federal scal authority, as there is no single denition of scal feder-
alism. If the goal is to compensate a member state for a decline in its income not only when this
decline is temporary (scal stabilization) but also when it is permanent (scal redistribution),
then the scal{federal structure of the US and Canada can be used as a template for the GCC.
In the absence of personal income taxation in the GCC, these programs can be nanced through
revenue-sharing arrangements so that the \have not" member states end up securing more (oil)
money.7
Alternatively, the supranational scal authority can coordinate among member states in set-
ting a medium-term common scal stance, subject to periodic revisions, as a means to synchro-
6Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the largest and wealthiest emirates, contribute to federal budget in agreed
amounts, but the federal responsibilities are managed by Abu Dhabi (Cevik 2011).
7See Buiter (2008) for further discussion of the issue of scal federalism in the context of the GCC.
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nize government spending within the monetary union. This involves outlining a medium-term
common scal budget, where the members are committed to remain within the strict purview
of the agreed upon expenditure levels and are willing to oset any shortfalls that may occur
due to changes in market conditions. Further, although a scal union generally provides an ex
post solution to crises within a monetary union, it is wise to take an ex ante approach to scal
federalism in the form of identifying possible sources of troubles (e.g., overspending) for the
stability of the unied monetary union.
In either case, strong coordination with the unied monetary authority is a prerequisite.
Union-wide expansionary scal spending, for example, can only be implemented if the common
central bank is well equipped with medium- to long-term debt instruments to sterilize excess
liquidity from the banking system.
A major obstacle to GCC scal union is the loss of discretionary scal spending power, espe-
cially those targeting social categories. For instance, following the political transformations in
the countries aected by the Arab Spring, the GCC governments launched politically motivated
scal measures in 2011 in a bid to avoid public protests (see Table 1). In a scal union, the
freedom of implementing such politically motivated scal measures will be seriously curtailed,
since any discriminatory politically motivated scal action in one country will create similar
pressure in other member states, due to the very unique economic and political structure of
the GCC countries. Given the nontrivial size of these expenses as a share of GDP, the GCC
governments thus face a dilemma about whether or not to give up (or curtail) the autonomy
of such political instruments in favor of a federal scal union to support the broader economic
union.
A specic characteristic of GCC diplomacy is that these countries tend to settle disputes
and disagreements between them through informal means, rather than resorting to institution-
based treatments. It is thus possible to have a shadow scal union without any institutional
constraint. The creation of a US$20 billion `Gulf development fund' in 2011 to provide nancial
assistance to Bahrain and Oman provides good validation of the GCC's general diplomatic
principles. The fund was set up by the four wealthiest members of GCC after Bahrain and
Oman were hit by public protests in early 2011. This fund will provide US$1 billion annually
over the next 10 years to both countries to address the socio-economic issues they face.
We conclude this section with a few remarks on the role of the common central bank as
a lender of last resort (LOLR). Some commentators (De Grauwe 2011; Wyplosz 2011) have
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Table 1: Summary of recent scal measures in GCC countries.
Time Country Package Contents
February 13, 2011 Bahrain Cash transfers of US$2,660 to each family.
January 17, 2011 Kuwait
Cash transfers of US$3,600 to each Kuwaiti citizen
and free essential food items for 18 months beginning
in February 2011. An estimated spending of about
3.25% of annual GDP.
February 27, 2011 Oman
Employment for 50,000 Omanis and establishment of
a monthly unemployment benet of US$390.
September 1, 2011 Qatar
Substantial increases in public sector salaries and pen-
sions beginning in September 2011, estimated at more
than 3% of GDP.
March 18, 2011 Saudi Arabia
Plan to construct 500,000 housing units, and build and
expand hospitals; a two-month salary bonus to state
employees and a 19% increase in the minimum public
sector wage.
February 1, 2011 UAE
Infrastructure stimulus program focusing on the
northern emirates, a 70% increase in pensions for mil-
itary personnel, and state subsidies for rice and bread.
Source: IMF (2011) and Al Masah Capital (2012).
pointed out that a key design aw in the Eurozone was the absence of a LOLR (i.e., the
European Central Bank, ECB) in government bond markets. As a result, the Eurozone has set
up the European Financial Stability Facility for this purpose. Under immense political pressure,
the ECB has lately announced that it will make itself the LOLR in government bond markets
under the new program, dubbed Outright Monetary Transactions.
Should the GCC learn such a lesson from the EMU? Experience shows that such a system
tends to be more crisis-prone (Johnson and Boone 2012). This is where the signicance of ex
ante scal arrangements within a monetary union apply. If the habit of irresponsible spending
beyond one's means is curtailed at the outset, the issue of the LOLR becomes less signicant.
Further, given the large accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in the form of sovereign
wealth funds, the GCC countries are well equipped to face a truly systematic nancial crisis.
Nonetheless, an `anti-crisis fund' can be created to partially mitigate the economic and social
costs of an unforeseen crisis.
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4 GCC Currency Union: Evaluating Exchange Rate Regimes
The single factor that characterizes GCC's aair with the US dollar is oil. As oil is priced,
invoiced and paid in US dollars, the GCC governments nd it natural to peg their currencies
to the dollar. The dollar peg worked relatively well in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily because
the oil price tended to revert to the mean; however, as the composition of global growth has
fundamentally shifted from the OECD countries to large emerging economies8 during the past
decade, resulting a disconnection between (i) oil prices and the federal funds rate (FFR) and
(ii) oil prices and the value of the US dollar (see Figures 3a, b). As these graphs show, oil prices
tended to mean-revert over 1973{2000, while since the beginning of 2001, they have shown a
highly positive trend. The fact that both `oil prices and the FFR' and `oil prices and the US
dollar' have moved in opposing directions in the past decade has important implications for the
currencies of the GCC countries.9
First, the fact that the Federal Reserve did not increase its targeted FFR during most of
the last decade when oil prices were rising strongly, suggests that the Federal Reserve was
more concerned with the deteriorating domestic economic conditions rather than the potential
inationary spillover of rising oil prices into the US economy. By comparison, facing a completely
dierent economic situation, the GCC countries wrongly imported the easy monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve at a time when their domestic economies were booming on the back of
soaring oil export revenues.10 The fact that oil prices and the FFR have diverged in the last
decade is a powerful validation of the economic de-coupling of the US and GCC economies,
however temporary. As Figure 4 shows, although they continue to be volatile as before, the
nominal GDP growth in each of the GCC countries was much higher than that of the US.
Likewise, despite their high ination rates during 2000s, the GCC's real GDP growth rates
were well above the US level (see Figure 5). Conceptually, a country should raise (but not
lower) its interest rates when the domestic economy is booming to prevent a possible hard
landing.
Second, we also see that, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s when both the US dollar and oil
prices maintained a somewhat positive relationship, since the start of the last decade, that rela-
tionship has clearly diverged. In fact, for the rst time in history, the US dollar has persistently
8For example, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa { the so-called BRICS countries.
9I thank Stephen Jen for calling my attention to this point.
10See Elsamadisy et al. (2014) for an illustration of this point in the context of Qatar.
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depreciated at a time when oil prices persistently increased. The GCC currencies were hit hard
by the depreciating dollar. Since the GCC's nominal exchange rates could not adjust, all the
adjustment of the weakening dollar was reected in their real exchange rates in the form of
higher domestic price levels. As shown in Figure 6, save for Bahrain, compared to the US,
ination rates were much higher in the remaining GCC countries. Higher domestic ination
rates helped real interest rates to dip into negative territory. Negative real interest rates, in
turn, contributed to both asset and goods price ination, posing a long-term risk to nancial
stability and misallocation of capital.11
Although the decoupling of the US dollar and the FFR from the oil price makes a strong
case for the GCC to ditch the dollar peg that has lasted for over 30 years, a more fundamental
argument against the dollar peg comes from the evidence of the structural economic shifts that
the GCC economies have experienced in the rst decade of the 21st century. The GCC now
has a vibrant non-hydrocarbon sector,12 a relatively sophisticated nancial sector and a healthy
balance of payment surplus. Further, both the GCC's imports and exports are increasingly
exposed to demand from emerging Asian countries (especially China), while its monetary policy
is still guided by the Federal Reserve. The unreasonableness and the unsustainability of this mix
of structural economic shifts in the GCC economies and the imported interest rate policy should
be clear to the GCC policy makers. To put this into perspective, imagine the predicament China
would be in had it maintained its de facto peg to the dollar.
It is clear from the discussion above that the GCC countries must soon adopt a more
exible exchange rate regime (and hence a more independent monetary policy) to deal with,
among others, large swings in global commodity prices. In the remainder of this section, we
consider several alternative exchange rate choices, keeping in mind the structural characteristics
of the GCC economies. Some variations of the proposed exchange rate regimes have already
been discussed in Sester (2007), Jen (2008) and Khan (2009). It must be emphasized that the
proposed currency regimes are not conditional on the formation of the GCC monetary union,
and can be implemented both at the individual and/or regional level.
11Further, the GCC's large current account surpluses (see Figure 7) translated into rapid monetary growth,
while the signicant scal intake from oil-related activities has fueled infrastructural and other spending. These,
along with the weak dollar and world food price ination, were the main drivers of ination in the GCC countries
{ see Basher and Elsamadisy (2012) for further discussion.
12This point helps to explain the puzzling result obtained by Jean Louis et al. (2010): Why GCC's non-oil
sector does not respond the same way to US monetary policy shocks as its oil sector?
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4.1 The BBC Regime
\BBC" stands for basket, band, and crawl, and was popularized by Williamson (2000). The
basket part of the BBC proposal involves pegging a country's currency to a set of its trading
partners' currencies. The currencies (and their associated weights) in the basket are generally
determined based on a country's commodity trade with its trading partners; subject to data
availability, service trade and nancial ows can also be considered when selecting the optimal
number of currencies. For the GCC, a relevant issue is which weights to use: exports, imports
or both. Until today, GCC's exports { dominated by oil and gas { have not faced competi-
tive pressure in the international market mainly due to a lack of alternatives to hydrocarbon
products.13 Further, the share of non-oil exports in the GCC's total exports is still small and
non-oil exports tend to comprise oil-related products such as petrochemicals. Based on these
facts, it is not viable to include exports in the calculation of the weights because preserving the
price competitiveness of merchandise exports is yet to be a policy target for the GCC due to
its unique pattern of trade. This leaves import weights as the principal basis of the construc-
tion of a currency basket. Indeed, for the GCC the pressing goal is to preserve the purchasing
power of imports due to its heavy dependence on importing a large spectrum of commodities
(including agricultural, food, industrial and capital goods). Further, given the specic structure
of the GCC's domestic production base, imports are widely considered as one of the factors of
production.
One of the main challenges that GCC countries face is the volatility of their income, due to
large uctuations in oil prices. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the GCC's nominal and real GDP
growth is far more volatile than that of the US. High income volatility exerts a negative eect on
consumption and investment, and is the leading cause of the pro-cyclicality of budget decits in
GCC countries.14 The currency basket based on import weights proposed above is not equipped
to deal with income volatility stemming from large swings in oil prices. One way to dampen
income volatility is to include the price of oil alongside the trading partners' currencies in the
conventional basket. This is the well-known `peg to export price' (PEP) system proposed by
Frankel (2005). By including oil price in the currency basket, the value of the domestic currency
is allowed to move in tandem with the uctuations in oil prices. Thus, when the dollar price of
13However, the coming boom in global natural gas production will increasingly challenge the hegemony of oil,
and may replace oil as a transport fuel and as a feedstock in petrochemicals in a few decades.
14Over the 1970{2002 period, the average pro-cyclicality of decits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE
was estimated at 12% compared to a counter-cyclicality of about 16% in the OECD countries. See Shamloo
(2005) for additional discussion.
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exports rises (falls), the domestic currency appreciates (depreciates) in terms of dollars. Such
accommodation of the terms of trade shocks is precisely what is needed to dampen the income
volatility of GCC countries. Therefore, the recommended rst step for GCC countries is to
devise a broad currency basket that also includes the price of oil.
The second element of the BBC system is a band as a target around the central parity (inter-
preted as up to 5%, 10% or even 15%). Given the diculty of estimating the equilibrium
exchange rate, the primary rationale for bands is to provide the exibility to prevent volatility
in the nancial markets from adversely aecting the real economy, as seen, for example, in
the strong but temporary capital inows in Qatar and the UAE prior to the intensication
of the nancial crisis in mid-2008.15 A natural response in such a situation is to widen the
policy bands as volatility increases in foreign exchange markets and subsequently narrow them
when some degree of calm returns to the market. During the Asian nancial crisis, the policy
band helped the Monetary Authority of Singapore to mitigate the short-term volatility of the
Singapore dollar against major currencies (cf. Robinson 2001).
The nal element of the BBC regime is the crawl. The crawling band exchange rate regime is
implemented through continuous adjustment of the trade-weighted nominal eective exchange
rate of the domestic currency, usually at a rate of crawl based on the dierential between the
domestic ination target and the forecasted ination of the trading partner countries. For the
fast-growing GCC countries, a crawling band oers additional exibility for ghting ination.
A basket-based system of exchange rate determination, although more complicated than
the xed peg, is not a stranger to GCC countries. Kuwait has been living with a currency
basket since 1975, except between January 2003 and May 2007, when the Kuwaiti dinar was
pegged to the US dollar. The solid track record of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the
country's central bank, in managing its exchange rate system under the BBC principles tells us
that even for small open economies in the GCC, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar,
an independent monetary regime with a exible exchange rate system is not only feasible but
also desirable for their quest for national economic transformation. In fact, as demonstrated
in Hassan et al. (2013), Bahrain|the smallest nation among GCC|has been pursuing an
independent monetary policy in the form of countercyclical credit policy even though it is in
a xed exchange rate system like her Gulf neighbours. So \there is no reason why the GCC
15See Elsamadisy et al. (2014) for an analysis of the consequences of speculative capital inows on the domestic
banking sector in Qatar.
11
countries as a whole cannot maintain an independent monetary policy by forming the GCC
central bank" (Hassan et al. 2013, p. 1586).
4.2 The Floating Regime
A pure oat oers the possibility of transforming the new GCC currency into a major inter-
national currency in the long run. One way to achieve this is by pricing the GCC's exports
(largely oil and natural gas) in its own currency. Pricing exports in the local currency will im-
mediately create a sizable international market for the new GCC currency. Given the imperfect
substitutes for oil and natural gas in the world market, there will be a natural demand for the
new GCC currency. However, the main impediment on the implementation of a free oat is
the lack of economic diversication within the GCC. Unless the GCC's economy becomes as
diversied as that of Australia, Canada or Norway, a pure oat will likely experience greater
exchange rate volatility than a managed oat based on the BBC principles.
In fact, before adopting a fully-edged BBC system, GCC countries could contemplate
widening exchange rate band around the existing xed parity as a means to gain more exibility
to their currencies. For instance, if Qatar considers a 5% band around the existing parity (i.e.,
US$1=QR3.64), it would allow the monetary authority to steer its currency in a direction that
is supportive to its monetary policy goal(s). Of course, identifying the actual width of the
band would require detailed analysis to eliminate the need to speculate, but the upshot of this
argument is that a move from the current status quo arrangement to a more exible exchange
rate system would demand minimal institutional arrangements.
Summing up, the GCC monetary union based on the BBC currency system raises many
positive possibilities. An independent currency will allow GCC economies to eectively manage
external shocks, and it will also contribute positively to the regional economy. For example,
Yemen may nd it attractive to peg its currency to the new GCC currency, or Iraq may wish to
join the GCC monetary union as a new member. A well-designed GCC monetary union could
trigger a much needed macroeconomic transformation throughout the Middle East and North
Africa region, and may pave the way to eventually turn into a Pan-Arab monetary union.
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5 Concluding Remarks
While many commentators have been openly critical of China's currency policy on the basis
of an undervalued renminbi, despite a similar surge in GCC's balance of payment surpluses in
the rst decade of this century, the vast majority of the commentators have maintained a stony
silence on the undervalued Gulf currencies. This underscores the geopolitics of currencies as a
form of asymmetric warfare and the consequences of dollar, euro or renminbi diplomacy. The
rst goal of this paper has been to highlight that the creation of a genuine scal union must
be a political priority for the GCC countries in order for the proposed Gulf monetary union to
function well. The second goal relates to the choice of an appropriate currency regime for the
Gulf monetary union, keeping in mind the distinct nature of GCC's undiversied economy. In
particular, a BBC (Basket, Band, and Crawl) exchange-rate system has been advocated in light
of GCC's changing trade patterns and the supposed capability of BBC to deal with volatile
income ows and/or large swings in global commodity prices. It is important to reiterate that
the proposed exchange rate regimes are not conditional on the formation of the Gulf monetary
union, and can be implemented individually or collectively.
As implied in the famous remark by John Connally in the Introduction, the GCC has to
solve its own problem and the time to act is now. The decoupling of `oil prices and federal
funds rate' and `oil prices and the dollar' in the past decade makes a strong case against the
sustainability of the dollar peg for the GCC countries. Further, the real interest rates in the
US has been in the negative territory for a considerable time already|thanks to the Federal
Reserve's zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. With a comparatively high ination
rates in the GCC region, do the policymakers in the GCC really believe that a suciently large
negative real interest rate can be prevailed without any risks and costly side-eects for price and
nancial stability. Given the relatively bright economic outlook for the GCC region, the cost of
continuing to import an ultra-easy monetary policy (and the resulting weakness and volatility
in the US dollar) will be heavy for the GCC economy. The GCC has to realize the shift in the
world's oil demand from industrial to emerging markets that took place over the last decade,
and translate this into action by making the required reforms in its exchange rate policy. The
GCC has much to gain from greater exchange rate exibility, and the world economy would
also benet from an eective global adjustment.
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Figure 1: Inter-GCC imports (% of total imports in the respective countries). Source: Direction
of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations. BAH,
Bahrain; KUW, Kuwait; OMN, Oman; QAT, Qatar. KSA, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; UAE,
United Arab Emirates.
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Figure 2: Inter-GCC exports (% of total exports in the respective countries). Source: Direction
of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations. BAH,
Bahrain; KUW, Kuwait; OMN, Oman; QAT, Qatar. KSA, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; UAE,
United Arab Emirates.
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(a) The US’s interest rate versus oil prices
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Figure 3: Oil price, federal funds rate and US dollar nominal eective exchange rate (EER).
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
the author's own calculations.
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Figure 4: Nominal GDP growth in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic
Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 5: Real GDP growth in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic
Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 6: Ination rates in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic Outlook
database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 7: Current account balance in the US and GCC countries (% of GDP). Source: World
Economic Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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